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The prosperity of the richest countries is at an all-time high, and so is their capacity 
to look beyond their own immediate needs. At the same time, the crisis of the 
poorest countries is acute, and the shortcomings of the current strategy of 







Advancing the cause of trade liberalization is a tough business to be in these 
days. Recent attempts to resuscitate the World Trade Organization (WTO) or 
launch new sets of negotiations such as the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA) have met a groundswell of opposition. Hoards of anti-
globalization protesters have demonstrated at virtually every meeting of 
international economic leaders held in the past two years. The activists accuse 
international institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund of promoting a manifesto for global corporations to the 
detriment of ordinary citizens. In support of the “race to the bottom” thesis, 
they point to the growing income divergence between countries of the  
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developed and developing world that has occurred in recent decades despite 
the massive growth in world trade volumes.
1 
Economists and trade policy experts remain convinced that trade 
liberalization is good for countries. A link between freer trade and income 
growth has been established in a number of economic studies.
2 Income 
growth is an essential contributor to, although not necessarily a guarantee of, 
poverty reduction (Max, 2001). International commitments can also foster 
better domestic policies. Trade liberalization brings with it regulatory reform 
in critical areas such as telecommunications and financial services that can be 
an important factor in promoting economic development.  
Western political leaders, no doubt frustrated by the protesters that 
upstage their every meeting, have seized on the potential for trade 
liberalization to alleviate poverty in the developing world. Their message is 
that improved global economic integration is not part of a grand corporate 
agenda but a humanitarian one. Among the items included in the 
Communiqué of the 2001 G8 leaders’ summit in Genoa is a pledge to launch 
a comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations aimed at addressing 
the concerns of the developing world. Similar commitments were made 
leading up to the ill-fated WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle.  
The developing world has some reason to be sceptical. The West has 
long preached the benefits of trade liberalization while selectively choosing 
only those elements of the liberalization agenda that it finds palatable. High 
barriers persist in the textiles, clothing and agriculture sectors, despite 
successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, 
developing country members of the WTO are being held to commitments to 
introduce western-style regimes such as intellectual property enforcement 
measures. Issues of priority to the developing world like labour mobility are 
not even on the negotiating table.  
                                                             
1A recent report of the United Nations Committee for Trade and Develop- 
ment (UNCTAD) decried the increased marginalization of the world’s poorest. The 48 
poorest nations accounted for 13 per cent of the world’s population in 1997 but only 0.4 per 
cent of the world’s exports and 0.6 per cent of the world’s imports. See Lukas (2000, p. 
15).   
2Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner concluded that developing countries with open 
economies grew over six times faster in the 1970s and 1980s than countries whose 
economies were closed to trade (Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
The fact that there are so many developing country members of the 
WTO indicates that poorer countries are not yet prepared to give up on the 
multilateral trading system. Developing nations account for over 100 of the 
roughly 140 members of the WTO. Dozens of other developing countries  
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have indicated an interest in undergoing the WTO accession process, an 
undertaking that is long, demanding and with uncertain outcomes.  
The key benefit developing nations see in WTO membership is the 
promise it holds of greater access to markets in the developed world. As 
major exporters of industrial goods, many strive to emulate the East Asian 
miracle based on export-led growth and are anxious to participate in 
negotiations aimed at reducing import barriers. Countries know that trade 
brings new technologies and practices that can make domestic industries more 
competitive. They also recognize that membership in international rules-
making institutions can make them a more attractive location for foreign 
investment. The WTO’s dispute settlement provisions can also assist 
developing nations targeted by unilateral measures taken by richer countries in 
areas such as intellectual property and money laundering.  
 This paper examines how effectively the multilateral trading system has 
addressed developing country concerns in the past and considers some 
proposals for achieving a fairer balance in the world trading system. It is 
organized into sections that reflect the major trade negotiating areas of 
concern to the developing world: market access, textiles and clothing, 
agricultural trade, anti-dumping, intellectual property, the new trade agenda 







What are developing countries to make of the rhetoric in favour of rapid 
liberalization, when rich countries with full employment and strong safety nets argue 
that they need to impose protective measures to help those adversely affected by 
trade? Or when rich countries play down the political pressures within developing 
countries — insisting that their polities ‘face up to the hard choices’ — while 
excusing their own trade barriers and agricultural subsidies by citing ‘political 
pressures’? 
(Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000)  
 
Better market access was an overriding objective for developing countries 
participating in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Negotiators made important 
advances in reducing tariffs, disciplining the use of non-tariff measures and 
expanding trade in services. Developing countries participated fully in all 
aspects of the market access negotiations and made significant concessions, 
particularly on tariffs. Despite the progress made in the Uruguay Round,  
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however, developing country exporters still remain at a disadvantage in 
accessing foreign markets.  
Rich countries continue to impose higher tariffs on products of export 
interest to developing countries than they levy on products imported from 
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. The average OECD tariff on manufactured product imports from 
poor countries is estimated to be four times higher than the average tariff on 
imports from rich countries (Hertel and Martin, 2000). Textiles, clothing, 
food products, and footwear continue to attract high levels of tariff protection 
in developed economies. Moreover, tariffs often escalate with the degree of 
processing, discouraging the further processing of basic commodities in 
developing nations.
3 
                                                             
3Studies have found that a similar bias against exports from the developing world 
exists with respect to non-tariff barriers. Based on 1992 data, Low and Yeats (1995) 
calculated that 18 per cent of the non-oil exports from developing countries encountered non-
tariff measures compared to only 10 per cent of exports from OECD countries. The disparity 
was even greater for specific sectors such as clothing and textiles. While members committed 
to removing quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers in the Uruguay Round, the 
time frame for their elimination is long; until 2005 in the case of textiles and clothing, for 
example. Other non-tariff barriers, notably those in the agricultural area, were replaced by 
prohibitive tariffs. 
To a large extent, developed countries have relied on the duty relief they 
provide least-developed countries under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) as an excuse for not proceeding with across-the-board 
tariff cuts. Research has shown, however, that GSP has had only a modest 
effect on trade and incomes in developing nations (Whalley, 1999, p. 1091). 
One reason is that it is entirely up to the developed countries providing the 
duty relief to determine the recipient countries and the products that qualify 
for GSP treatment. Quite often, “sensitive” goods like textiles are excluded. 
Since developed country tariffs on “non-sensitive” goods are already fairly 
low, tariff relief under the GSP provides little extra advantage. Second, 
security of access is never assured. GSP is a unilateral tariff concession that is 
not bound and can be withdrawn at any time. A poor human rights record or 
weak enforcement of intellectual property rights can disqualify countries from 
eligibility. The threat of “graduation” from GSP status is always present and 
can be used to exact concessions from developing country recipients.  
In the aftermath of the failed Seattle ministerial meeting the European 
Union, the United States, Japan and Canada have pledged free access to 
imports from the least-developed nations. Like the GSP system, the proposals 
do not go far enough in addressing the impediments to access. The benefits 
would apply to only the 48 countries on the United Nations’ list of least- 
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developed countries. Moreover, exemptions will continue to exist. For 
example, European members states are resisting the idea of free access for 
sugar and other sensitive products. Canada’s initiative will still leave duties on 
10 per cent of imports from least-developed countries. As Bhagwati (2001, p. 
23) notes, special programs aimed at the most needy countries merely shift 
limited market access amongst the poorest rather than expanding access 
opportunities for all developing nations.  
Aside from reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers, the Uruguay 
Round market-access negotiations made significant strides in opening markets 
to trade in services. As with the case of impediments to trade in goods, 
however, liberalization mostly focused on areas of export interest to rich 
countries. Emphasis was placed on rights of establishment and on changes in 
domestic regulatory environments to provide access to foreign service 
providers. A key negotiating priority for developing countries  — labour 
mobility — was dismissed by industrialized nations. To the extent that it was 
addressed at all, it was in the context of temporary access for accountants, 
lawyers and insurance executives, not freer entry for construction and other 
non-professional workers. 
The import barriers of developed nations are only one aspect of the 
market access challenge facing the developing world. Their own import 
barriers is the other. As Winters (1999, p. 43) has observed: “countries are 
more affected by their own trade policies than by their partners’, and, of 
course, it is the former over which they have the most influence”. The largest 
gains from trade occur through the consumer savings that arise from 
reductions in domestic import barriers.  
A comprehensive analysis of market access achievements made in the 
Uruguay Round by Finger and Schuknecht (1999) concludes that tariffs are 
disproportionally imposed by developing economies and the biases against 
exports from developing economies exist as much in developing economy 
tariffs as in tariffs of developed economies. Even after the reductions made in 
the Uruguay Round, developing country tariffs remain several times higher 
than rates levied by developed countries.
4  
A number of authors blame the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) concept of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for the 
persistence of high import barriers in developing nations (i.e., Bhagwati, 
2001). The origins of SDT lie in development ideology of the 1950s and were 
                                                             
4Finger and Schuknecht (1999) have estimated the average post-Uruguay Round 
applied ad valorem tariff rate to be 2.6 per cent for developed economies and 13.3 per cent 
for developing economies.   
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popularized in the Singer-Prebisch thesis. It held that the protection of infant 
industries and preferential access to markets in the developed world was the 
only means to avoid a secular decline in the terms of trade of developing 
nations  (Whalley, 1999). The extension of this idea, which was formally 
introduced in the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, was that developing 
countries should not have to reciprocate negotiating concessions made by 
other GATT members. 
In many respects the SDT concept institutionalized the second-tier status 
of developing nations. In departing from fundamental GATT principles, it 
also allowed developed countries to get away with their own GATT-
inconsistent practices such as the Multi-Fibre Agreement (Srinivasan, 1999, 
p. 1051). The result was that until the Uruguay Round, little progress was 
made in reducing trade barriers in developing countries. The reductions that 
did occur were often as a result of intervention by the World Bank, not 
through multilateral negotiations (Pangestu, 2000, p. 1290). 
SDT is only part of the explanation for the south’s reluctance to reduce 
import barriers. Many developing countries levy duties not for protective 
effect but as a second-best policy option. For countries with a rudimentary 
tax system, for example, customs duties are the cheapest and most effective 
way for governments to raise revenue. Countries that lack a competition 
policy regime use import duties to guard against anti-competitive behaviour on 
the part of foreign corporations  (Whalley, 1999, p. 1091). Developing 
countries frequently lack the technical expertise and resources to implement 
the other policy changes that would make tariff reduction possible. 
It was only in the latest round of trade negotiations that developing 
countries participated as full players in market access negotiations. Many 
have come to recognize the limitations of non-reciprocity and understand the 
benefits of reducing their own import barriers. A number of difficulties 
remain, however, including the challenge of replacing government revenue 
lost as a result of tariff reductions. Developed countries can help by providing 
technical assistance in this area. However, the most important priority for 
future trade negotiations is reductions in barriers that rich countries maintain 
against imports from the developing world.
5 It is time to expand market 
access negotiations to include sectors that matter not only to rich countries 
but to poor countries also.  
                                                             
5Anne Krueger has advised developing countries to press for across-the-board, not 
zero-for-zero access in upcoming trade negotiations. This would ensure that developed 
countries do not resort to their traditional strategy of selecting only those sectors where they 
have a comparative advantage and removing the political pressure these sectors can exert for 
liberalization of other restrictions (Krueger, 1999).  




Textiles and Apparel 
 
 
It is shameful for their wealthy trading partners to continue to maintain tariffs and 
quotas against the products for which the least-developed countries have a clear 
economic advantage. (Michael Moore, 2001) 
 
In their accounting of U.S. trade barriers, Hufbauer and Elliott termed textile 
and clothing import restraints “the Mount Everest of U.S. trade protection”.
6 
The same could also be said for the clothing and textile barriers levied by 
other countries in the developed world. A combination of restrictive import 
quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and high import duties 
levied by industrialized nations has frustrated developing country exporters 
for decades.  
                                                             
6Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) estimated that clothing and apparel import barriers 
account for 9 per cent of the economic cost of trade protection in the United States.  
It is hard to find a more compelling north-south trade issue. Textile and 
apparel production is viewed as a critical “first” industry in the process of 
industrial development and accounts for roughly 20 per cent of industrialized 
exports from the developing world. Moreover, quantitative restrictions in 
textiles and clothing are almost exclusively targeted at products exported from 
the developing to the developed world. With minor exceptions, they do not 
affect trade between developed countries (Low and Yeats, 1995, p. 58).  
Since the 1950s, developed countries have relied on “voluntary” export 
restraints negotiated on a bilateral basis with developing nations to limit their 
imports of textile and apparel products. Although it constituted a fundamental 
violation of GATT principles, quantitative restrictions on clothing and textile 
exports were formalized under GATT auspices in a series of “trading 
arrangements” made over the following two decades culminating in the MFA 
in 1974. The arrangement was extended in 1977, 1981, 1986 and 1991. 
Despite the strong case for liberalization, progress has been painfully 
slow. Powerful producer lobbies in the OECD countries are only part of the 
explanation. The healthy rents accruing to MFA quota-holders in traditional 
exporting countries such as Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan have made them 
staunch defenders of the status quo intent on keeping out newer producers 
from places like Bangladesh, Pakistan and India.  
Although members agreed in the Uruguay Round to integrate textile and 
apparel products into the GATT 1994, true trade liberalization still remains a  
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long way off. The implementation period is ten years in duration and little 
liberalization will occur until the very end. Phase-out requirements refer to 
import categories, not import volumes and countries have selected for early 
liberalization categories where no quota restrictions apply or import categories 
that face little competition from developing countries, such as yarns and 
fabrics. As an illustration, by January 1, 1998, 33 per cent of imports had to 
be brought under the GATT rules. The United States has met its obligations 
but in a way that eliminated only 1 per cent of its MFA commitments. The 
record for the European Union (EU) and Canada was somewhat better at 7 
and 14 per cent respectively (Finger and Schuler, 1999).  
The Uruguay Round negotiations instituted a system of transitional 
safeguards to cushion the effects of liberalization. The resulting mechanism to 
address import surges could end up being even more restrictive than the MFA 
quotas themselves (Hamilton and Whalley, 1995, p. 36). Developed countries 
have also maintained high rates of duty on textile and apparel imports and 
most have exempted clothing and textile products from the GSP and other 
tariff preferences that they offer developing nations. 
Lest the combination  of residual quota restrictions, high duties and 
transitional safeguards offers insufficient protection from textile and apparel 
imports from the developing world, rich countries can resort to the use of 
anti-dumping measures. Producers in the EU and the United States have 
already taken anti-dumping actions against a variety of textile products. It is 
expected that anti-dumping cases will multiply as the end of the 
implementation period approaches (Reinert, 2000, p. 41; Hamilton and 
Whalley, 1995).    
Developed countries remain concerned that the West might renege 
entirely on its Uruguay Round commitments with respect to clothing and 
textiles (Reinert, 2000). Should this happen, it would amount to a 















Barriers to developing country exports in industrialized markets continue to 
severely disadvantage poor countries. Industrialized countries spend more than 
$300 billion a year on agricultural subsidies. That is roughly equal to the total GNP 
for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. And yet, even today developed country tariffs on 
meat, fruits, and vegetables — all primary exports from the developing world — 
can exceed 100 per cent. Debt relief without increased market access is a sham. 
(James D. Wolfensohn, 2001) 
 
The notion that developing countries glean the preponderance of their 
earnings from farming and other primary industries is outdated. In fact, 
manufactured products account for over 70 per cent of the exports of 
developing  countries and could rise to 80 per cent by 2005 (Hertel and 
Martin, 2000). Despite this, agriculture is perhaps the most critical sector for 
developing countries to address in the next round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. As Kym Anderson has noted, the welfare cost to developing 
countries of OECD agricultural policies is estimated to well exceed the cost of 
protection to the textile and clothing sector. For the world as a whole, 
agricultural policies are more damaging to economic welfare than are tariffs 
on industrial goods, despite agriculture’s small share of global trade and GDP 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 3). 
Farm subsidy and support programs in rich countries negate the natural 
comparative advantage developing countries have in the production of many 
basic agricultural commodities. Rice, sugar and peanuts are examples of 
goods that trade on world markets at prices well below domestic support price 
levels in industrialized nations. High trade barriers in developed countries shut 
out many food imports from the developing world. Domestic farm subsidies 
in developed nations create food surpluses that are sold in world markets, 
sometimes with the assistance of export subsidies, driving world prices to 
uneconomic levels. Food aid compounds the difficulties, particularly since 
rich countries are more inclined to donate food when prices are low and 
surpluses high, destroying any opportunity for local farmers in recipient 
countries to earn a fair return. The fact that many of the poor in the 
developing world live in farm households means that low and unstable global 
food prices affect a large proportion of their population.  
The Uruguay Round succeeded in bringing agriculture within the general 
GATT framework. Theoretically, agriculture will be subject to the same 
general disciplines that apply to manufactured goods. In reality, however, the 
extent of liberalization is very limited. Average agricultural tariffs in the  
276  Kathleen Macmillan 
industrialized nations remain in the 40 to 50 per cent range while tariffs on 
manufactured goods have steadily fallen to the 4 per cent level over the past 
50 years. Domestic subsidization is still permitted, although subject to certain 
constraints. While a variety of non-tariff barriers, such as Canada’s import 
restrictions on dairy, poultry and other supply-managed commodities, were 
converted to tariffs, the outcome of tariffication was, in the view of one 
observer, “scandalous” (Srinivasan, 1999, p. 1053). The tariff on butter 
imports to Canada is over 300 per cent. Japan has implemented tariffs of over 
1,000 per cent on some varieties of rice. Worse still, according to Hertel and 
Martin, is that the new tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) are less transparent than the 
previous quota regimes and they generate significant quota rents. This will 
make future liberalization very difficult to accomplish (Hertel and Martin, 
2000). Anderson (1999, p. 3) shares this view noting that the TRQs have 
created a new MFA — a multilateral food agreement — that could leave 
agricultural trade with quantitative restraints for decades to come. 
Real progress on agricultural trade liberalization remains some distance 
away. Although the European Union made some conciliatory overtures in the 
lead-up to the Seattle WTO ministerial meeting, it remains committed to its 
interventionist Common Agricultural Policy. Governments such as the EU’s 
and Japan’s have garnered strong support at home for the notion that farm 
policy is critical to achieving a host of non-agricultural objectives such as the 
protection of rural communities, the humane treatment of animals, and proper 
environmental stewardship. They maintain that because of this so-called 
“multifunctional” dimension of farm policy, agriculture should not be subject 
to the same sort of disciplines that govern trade in industrial goods. Outbreaks 
of mad cow and other diseases have strengthened the call for border 
restrictions in developed countries. Concern over genetically-modified 
products, the so-called “frankenfoods”, contribute to more trade 
impediments, n ot less. Like many other issues on the new trade agenda, 
developing nations view the West’s concern for food safety and the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture as thinly veiled attempts at protectionism.  
It does not help that developing nations are not entirely agreed on the 
desirability of agricultural trade reform. Countries such as Brazil, Argentina 
and Thailand have pressed for improved access for their food exports. But 
importing nations, recognizing that high subsidies in developed countries 
lower their food costs, are more ambivalent. Preferential trade arrangements, 
such as the Lomé Convention that favours former European colonies, have 
made some privileged developing countries strong advocates for the status 
quo.  
If agricultural trade reform is to have any success, it will need to form 
part of a broader package in future trade negotiations. Players such as the EU  
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are strongly resistant to liberalization, despite the solid economic case for it. It 
is essentially the EU and United States that will determine the prospect and 
pace of agricultural trade liberalization. One would hope that they will keep 







The fact that the WTO permits anti-dumping may make it sound respectable. It 
rarely is. (The Economist, October 3, 1998, p. 17) 
 
Use of trade remedy laws, until now a prerogative of developed nations, 
undermines legitimate attempts to liberalize trade. In Stiglitz’s view (2000, p. 
439), nowhere is the hypocrisy of the developed world greater than when it 
comes to anti-dumping.  
Dumping occurs when an exporter sells goods to a foreign market at less 
than the price it charges in its home market or at a price that does not fully 
cover its average total cost of production. The GATT allows an importing 
country to impose special duties on dumped imports that cause or threaten to 
cause material injury to its producers of the competing product. The duties 
remain in place for up to five years but can be renewed if a threat of injury 
continues to exist.  
Economists have rarely understood the rationale for anti-dumping 
measures (see, for example, Boltuck and Litan, 1991; and Macmillan, 1995). 
Price discrimination is normal behaviour for profit-maximizing firms. It is only 
natural that price discrimination would occur across international borders, 
particularly since factors like tariff protection at home might warrant higher 
prices in the domestic market. Analyses of anti-dumping cases have 
concluded that only rarely would they qualify as genuine predatory pricing 
behaviour (Hutton and Trebilcock, 1992; Willig, 1998). Instead, anti-dumping 
has become a valuable weapon of corporate strategy for oligopolistic 
industries, particularly in the metals, chemical, machinery and textile sectors. 
The proliferation of anti-dumping actions by developed nations is an 
important factor behind Sylvia Ostry’s (1990, p. 17) characterization of the 
1980s as “the decade of the privatization of trade policy”.  
Anti-dumping measures are a highly effective protectionist tool. 
Typically, the duties imposed are many times higher than prevailing nominal 
tariff rates. It is not unusual to have anti-dumping duties in the 20 to 50 per 
cent range, sometimes higher. Almost always, the imposition of anti-dumping  
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measures wipe out imports from affected countries and has a “chilling” effect 
on shipments from other countries. The information and legal demands for 
exporters hit by an anti-dumping action are extremely onerous and expensive. 
Quite often, developing country exporters targeted by anti-dumping actions do 
not even bother attempting to defend their interests.   
Countries made a half-hearted attempt to address the interests of the 
developing world in the Uruguay Round negotiations on anti-dumping. The 
text of the WTO agreement stipulates that particular regard be given by 
developed country members to the special situation of developing country 
members when considering the application o f anti-dumping duties. 
Competition policy solutions are suggested as an alternative. However, many 
countries, including Canada, have not even implemented this aspect of the 
Anti-dumping Agreement into their domestic legislation, let alone excused any 
developing country member of anti-dumping duties that would otherwise 
apply. 
The use of anti-dumping measures continues unabated. According to the 
latest WTO Annual Report, WTO members notified 360 initiations of anti-
dumping investigations i n 1999, up 42 per cent over 1998. The European 
Union and India reported the highest number of initiations in 1999, 68 each, 
followed by the United States at 45 initiations. Despite the introduction in the 
WTO Anti-dumping Agreement of a five-year sunset clause in 1995, the 
accumulated stock of anti-dumping measures in existence continues to grow. 
In mid-2000, an estimated 1,211 final anti-dumping findings were in place 
worldwide, 300 of which were accounted for the United States and 190 by 
the European Union. Canada ranks fifth in the world for the number of anti-
dumping measures levied, with 88 (WTO, 2001).  
There is good reason to fear that matters will get worse before they get 
better. Anti-dumping has become entrenched in the world trading system with 
the recent introduction of legislation in many countries, including dozens of 
developing nations. Developing countries have learned well from their 
developed counterparts and have levied many actions against each other, with 
China being a favourite target. Anti-dumping measures, per dollar of imports, 
are now probably higher among developing nations than among developed 
nations (Finger and Schuknecht, 1999, p. 36).  
An even greater concern for the future is that the anti-dumping system 
will be used by industrial countries as a way to escape liberalization 
commitments in other areas. There is already some indication that clothing 
and textile import restraints could be replaced with anti-dumping findings. The 
removal of quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers could lead to 
a renewed interest in anti-dumping among producers in industrialized nations.   
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There is no shortage of creative ideas for reforming the anti-dumping 
system. Alternatives such as the use of import safeguards or competition 
policy measures have been advocated for years by trade policy analysts. 
What has been absent is the political will for reform, particularly in the United 
States. The fact that Canada and the United States with their similar domestic 
regulatory regimes cannot even agree to restrain the use of anti-dumping 
measures on bilateral trade does not bode well for the prospect of significant 









The TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it positions the WTO primarily as 
a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf of multinational 
corporations. This is a bad image for the WTO.  
(Jagdish Bhagwati, 2001, p. 20) 
 
Developing country members had little alternative but to go along with the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIP). WTO’s 
“single undertaking” or “all or nothing” nature meant that members had to 
sign on to all its component agreements if they wanted to improve their 
market access in agriculture, textiles and other areas.  
Developing nations also considered a multilateral agreement preferable to 
the unilateral pressure they were under from developed nations to enforce 
western-style intellectual property obligations. Under Section 301 of the U.S. 
1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act, countries could be placed on a watch 
list for what was considered to be weak enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. The WTO’s TRIP commitments had one important advantage over 
the unilateral U.S. measures: disputes arising under the TRIP Agreement 
would at least be handled by the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions.  
While developing nations held their noses and agreed to the TRIP 
commitments during the Uruguay Round, many have yet to implement the 
obligations. At the end of 2000, one year past the deadline contained in the 
WTO agreement, some 70 countries have still not brought their domestic laws 
and regulations into conformity with the TRIP requirements. Implementation 
of the TRIP commitments — or, more accurately, the failure to do so — has 
become an important symbol of North-South trade relations, post-Uruguay.  
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The South quickly began to regret its grand bargain  — immediate 
implementation of Western-style intellectual property enforcement in return 
for the uncertain promise of improved market access and technical assistance 
sometime down the road. Many countries failed to appreciate at the time the 
tremendous burden involved in implementing intellectual property measures. 
In retrospect, it was simply unrealistic to expect that countries with little or no 
legal or regulatory tradition in this area could create a system within a few 
short years (Finger and Schuler, 1999).
7       
The very nature of the TRIP Agreement imposes an uneven burden on 
developing nations. Ciuriak (2001, pp. 257-258) notes that it represents a 
fundamental departure from the standard GATT approach in two important 
respects. First, unlike the old GATT which generally avoided pronouncing on 
matters of domestic regulation, the TRIP Agreement severs the implicit 
barrier between international and domestic policy. Second, Ciuriak observes 
that the TRIP Agreement departs from the typical practice followed in GATT 
tariff reductions of dictating symmetrical lowering of barriers to asymmetrical 
levels. Instead, it requires countries to institute asymmetrical reforms in their 
domestic policy regimes to achieve a uniform standard. Ostry sees this as part 
of a general shift from the negative regulation under the GATT — what 
governments must not do — to positive regulation — what governments 
must do (Ostry, 2001). Because they often begin with more rudimentary 
intellectual property policy regimes and a relative lack of policy resources, the 
implementation burden is especially difficult for developing nations.  
The TRIP Agreement might have even more ominous consequences in 
the future for developing nations. In using the international trade system to 
address non-trade objectives, Ciuriak believes that the Agreement creates a 
dangerous precedent. It opens the door to embedding other non-trade matters 
such as labour and environmental goals in the WTO, a possibility that gravely 
concerns developing countries. In the view of many trade policy experts, 
intellectual property enforcement is a matter that might have been better left 
with the World Intellectual Property Organization to determine (see Bhagwati, 
2001; Hufbauer, 2001; Srinivasan, 1999).  
                                                             
7There are essentially three transition periods for the TRIPs Agreement: developed 
countries, by January 1, 1996; developing and transition economies, by January 1, 2000; and 
least-developed countries by January 1, 2006.  
Others have asked even more basic questions about the fairness of 
requiring d eveloping countries to enforce the property rights of western 
industrialists. According to Jeffery Sachs, a vast inequality in innovation and 
technology diffusion is the root cause of much of the global divide. This could 
be eased if rich countries showed more restraint in asserting intellec-tual 
property rights. Patent protection renders life-saving pharmaceuticals and  
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seed varieties inaccessible to millions of impoverished citizens in the 
developing world. While an ad hoc solution has recently been found to make 
low-cost AIDS drugs available to highly infected African nations, other 
diseases remain untreated due to the prohibitive cost of patent medicines or 
because the rewards to pharmaceutical firms are too meager to interest them 
(Sachs, 2000). 
Winters (1999, p. 59) has also expressed concern that the creation and 
rigorous enforcement of intellectual property rights at the WTO could 
discourage researchers from focusing on the problems of poorer nations. He 
advocates special measures to disseminate publicly funded technologies and 
to develop crop technologies and health products for the poor. 
Developing countries are painfully aware that they often lack the 
necessary knowledge and technology to adequately provide for their citizens. 
Many view the rigorous enforcement of western intellectual property rights as 
limiting their access to this knowledge, perpetuating a world of “haves” and 
“have nots”. A better balance needs to be found between the desire to reward 
genuine innovation and the diffusion of ideas that could dramatically improve 
the well-being of the world’s poorest citizens. Arguably, the TRIP Agreement 




The New Trade Agenda 
 
 
Some lines will have to be drawn as to what is trade and trade-related policy — 
and what is not. Several, if not many, of the issues that have been brought into the 
realm of trade policy issues are in fact broadly trade-unrelated. Continuing to deal 
with them in a trade context is damaging to the cause of getting developing 
countries to support a new round. (Jagdish Bhagwati, 2001, p. 20)  
     
 
A disconnect has emerged between the trade policy objectives of the 
developing and developed world, post-Uruguay. Developing nations are 
preoccupied with implementation matters and remain committed to expanding 
market access. The West is considering expanding the scope of trade 
agreements to encompass social, environmental and other “values” issues. In 
reaction to pressures from non-governmental organizations and 
representatives of civil society  at home, western governments are also 
debating ways to make the WTO a more open and democratic institution.   
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One area where the developing world stands united is in opposition to the 
“trade and ...” initiatives. Former President Clinton’s support for the idea of 
trade sanctions to enforce core labour standards was a major reason behind 
the failure of the WTO’s Seattle ministerial meeting. Equally unpalatable to 
developing nations is the attempt to link trade and the environment. In their 
view, using the trading system to impose the West’s environmental or labour 
standards is simple protectionism that is designed to undermine their 
comparative advantage. 
Developing countries will strongly resist the introduction of labour and 
environmental standards into WTO Agreements and will likely object to any 
other “values” standards that depend on extraterritorial application of 
domestic norms. Their position is that these matters are best left to the 
relevant international body to administer. For its part, the U.S. Congress 
appears to consider labour and environmental standards as part of its trade 
agenda and has pressured the administration to include them in its recent pact 
with Jordan. This does not bode well for a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations or, indeed, for bridging the North-South divide.    
Another element of the new trade agenda that developing countries greet 
with scepticism is the bid to “democratize” the WTO. On the one hand, they 
welcome measures to improve the WTO’s “internal democracy” by wrestling 
control over key policy decisions from the small group of western nations that 
previously reigned. What they decry, however, are proposals to open WTO 
dispute settlement and committee meetings to non-governmental 
representatives (Bhagwati, 2001). They fear, with some reason, that the chief 
preoccupation of non-governmental organizations intervening before the 
WTO would be social and environmental considerations. Poorer nations view 
the deference that countries like Canada and the U nited States accord 
representatives of “civil society” with a measure of curiosity and mistrust.  
There is no doubt that the WTO needs to evolve as an institution if it is 
to remain relevant and effective. It is equally true that it cannot avoid 
addressing domestic regulation if it is to liberalize trade in important areas 
such as services and investment. However, the issues that divide developed 
and developing nations are considerably larger when it comes to the new 
trade agenda than in the more traditional areas of trade policy. They raise 
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Trade-Related Assistance    
 
 
The transition periods for implementation for developing countries were arbitrary 
and not based on any analysis or, indeed, on any awareness of [the] system 
problem. (Sylvia Ostry, 2000, p. 6) 
 
Developing nations have missed out on many of the benefits of participation 
in the multilateral trading system because they lack the resources to take 
advantage of them. Assistance is needed in several areas: to help implement 
the commitments they have already made, for trade adjustment, to represent 
their interests in trade disputes, to participate in future rounds of trade 
negotiations and to reform their policies and regulations to better capitalize on 
the new opportunities created by trade liberalization.   
As Ostry (1999, p. 21) has written, the one common element 
characterizing the new WTO issues is that they all deal with the institutional 
structure of domestic economies. As with negotiations on competition policy, 
financial services, e-commerce and investment, this necessarily infringes on 
areas of domestic regulation. Obligations to increase institutional transparency 
and reform domestic regulations gravely concern developing nations. And it is 
more than simply an issue of resources. Developing nations often lack the 
long history of institutional development that OECD nations have shared. In 
many instances, they are required to implement in several short years 
western-style legal and institutional systems that evolved over many centuries 
in the western nations themselves.  
The most immediate issue is that of implementation. Finger and Schuler 
(1999) estimate that the cost of implementing the WTO Agreements can 
easily exceed the entire development budget of a least-developed nation. It is 
many times greater than the burden that implementation represents for 
developed country members since the disciplines being imposed closely 
reflect the status quo in industrialized nations. 
Another issue is that of trade adjustment. Rich countries agonize over 
trade adjustment pressures affecting their textiles, apparel, steel and agricul-
ture sectors. These pale in comparison to the challenges facing countries in 
the developing world. As Stiglitz (2000, p. 440) points out, trade adjustment 
in developing countries is inhibited by many factors including government 
rigidities, rigidities in labour markets and lack of access to capital. These 
matters have to be addressed if trade liberalization i s to succeed. The 
standard competitiveness paradigm that applies in OECD economies does not 
always work in the developing world.  
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Help is also needed to allow developing country members to participate in 
trade negotiations and represent their interests in trade disputes. More than 
one-half of the WTO’s developing country members cannot even afford to 
have a full-time representative in Geneva. The WTO’s dispute-settlement 
mechanism, while much welcomed by developing nations, is too expensive 
for many to access. Often, developing countries lack the money and expertise 
to properly defend their own interests in WTO disputes or to participate in 
other disputes where important issues of principle are being decided.  
In recent years, international institutions have recognized that trade 
assistance needs to be supported by programs to back institutional and 
regulatory reform and development of social and physical infrastructure. 
Basic issues of governance need to be addressed and reforms undertaken to 
improve legal systems, infrastructure and private sector capabilities. The 
WTO’s own resources for trade-assistance are meager, in the range of US$ 
500,000 per year. International institutions have tried to improve coherence in 
recent years through initiatives such as “The Integrated Framework for 
Trade-Related Assistance to Least Developed Countries”. Unfortunately, the 
resources are still insufficient and their mandates ambiguous. Moreover, 
many of the measures are aimed solely at the least-developed countries when 
it is all the nations of the developing world that require technical and 
institutional resources. 
The failure to provide adequate trade-related assistance for developing 
countries was one of the greatest shortfalls of the Uruguay Round. More 
resources and a better appreciation of the implementation and adjustment 
burden facing developing countries is necessary if they are to become full 


















As many trade experts often point out, the WTO is not a development agency. 
That argument is true but irrelevant, because trade is not trade today. And the new 
focus on domestic policy and institutions creates spillover and linkages among 
policy domains and international institutions that never existed in the GATT. Thus, 
the implications of the grand bargain for the evolution of the WTO are profound 
and deserve far more analysis than has been provided to date. (Sylvia Ostry, 2000, 
p. 15)  
 
The legitimacy of the WTO depends critically on its ability to achieve a better 
balance between its developed and developing country members.  Multilateral 
trade relations have deteriorated sharply post-Uruguay with the refusal by 
many developing countries to implement Uruguay Round commitments and 
the very meagre progress in services and agricultural negotiations. It is up to 
developing country members, and particularly the influential “Quad” group of 
countries which includes Canada, to take up the challenge. Not only is a 
greater concern for the trade aspirations of developing countries the right 
thing to do from a development perspective but it is also essential to the 
future success of the multilateral trading system.   
The challenge is particularly relevant for the Canadian government, which 
is already under scrutiny for cutting back the budget of the Canadian 
International Development Agency during the 1990s.
8 Like the other 
industrialized countries, Canada does not allow international development 
officials much, if any, role in trade policy-making. The fact that the foreign 
aid and trade policy realms operate in virtual isolation is one reason why 
development issues are rarely taken into account in the trade policy of 
developed countries. 
                                                             
8OECD figures ranked Canada’s aid budget relative to the size of its economy as 
seventeenth out of 22 donor countries in 2000 (The Globe and Mail, April 27, 2001).  
There is much work to be done. Import barriers in developed country 
markets disproportionately penalize exports from the developing world. The 
West h as held out promise that agricultural and textile barriers will drop 
sometime in the future, but only in return for the immediate implementation 
of intellectual property regimes and reforms in other areas such as customs 
valuation, import-licensing, and technical, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
standards in developing nations. Poorer countries have been left largely on 
their own without outside technical resources to make the considerable 
changes to their domestic institutions and regulations that their WTO 
commitments require. Developed countries have steadfastly held onto their  
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protectionist weapon of choice — anti-dumping measures — the use of which 
can obliterate the effects of trade liberalization in other areas. More-over, the 
WTO threatens to evolve into a more transparent and democratic institution 
by allowing representations from NGOs, many of whom are intent on 
expanding agreements to include non-trade considerations like social and 
environmental standards which could undermine the comparative advantage 
of poorer countries. 
 The elements of a fairer trade system are quite obvious: the removal of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports from the developing world, reform of 
domestic agricultural programs, generous financial assistance and assistance in 
kind to developing nations to help them with implementation and trade 
adjustment, a substantial weakening of anti-dumping regimes and the refusal 
to include labour and other “values” standards in WTO Agreements.  
Sadly, trade policy has very little to do with fairness nor, indeed, with 
economic efficiency. If economic principles prevailed in trade policy-making, 
all countries would abandon protectionism unilaterally for domestic economic 
reasons. Instead, trade policy-making is dominated by special interests and, 
up until now, has represented a balance between the demands of import-
competing interests for protection and the desire of powerful exporters in 
industrialized nations for greater market access. The interests of developing 
nations have not been well served by what has essentially been a mercantilist 
bargaining model.  
Previous rounds of trade negotiations have not been entirely devoid of 
non-economic objectives, however. The desire to provide a basis for a lasting 
peace was the major consideration behind the creation of the GATT in the 
postwar period. If it is to succeed, the WTO needs a unifying mission that is 
more persuasive than merely economics. As Ostry points out in this volume, 
Canada has played a lead role on many previous occasions mobilizing middle-
power support for difficult negotiations (Ostry, 2001). It is hard to imagine a 
more worthy political, economic and humanitarian cause for Canada to 
champion than a WTO that better addresses the interests of the developing 
world. This must begin by acknowledging the degree to which trade policy in 
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